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In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions
in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the
respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple
discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness –
and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the
discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity
analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex
and uncertain than we have imagined.General conclusion
In concluding this multi-part article, let me begin once
again with a brief review of what we have already cov-
ered. For the full text of the General Introduction to the
entire article, the reader is referred to Part 1 [1]. The
General Introduction reviewed the history of the article,
which originated in a critique by Robert Spitzer and
Allen Frances, Chairmen respectively of the DSM-III
and DSM-IV Task Forces, over the ongoing work of the
DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups. In a series of arti-
cles and blog postings in Psychiatric Times, Frances (at
times with Spitzer) carried out a sustained critique of
the DSM-5 work in which he focused both on issues of
transparency and issues of process and content [2-15].
In the course of this debate over DSM-5 I proposed to
Allen in early 2010 that we use the pages of the Bulletin
of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy
and Psychiatry (of which I am Editor) to expand and
bring more voices into the discussion. This led to two
issues of the Bulletin in 2010 devoted to conceptual* Correspondence: james.phillips@yale.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orissues in DSM-5 [16,17]. (Vol 17, No 1 of the AAPP Bul-
letin will be referred to as Bulletin 1, and Vol 17, No 2
will be referred to as Bulletin 2. Both are available
at http://alien.dowling.edu/~cperring/aapp/bulletin.htm.)
Interest in this topic is reflected in the fact that the sec-
ond Bulletin issue, with commentaries on Frances’
extended response in the first issue, and his responses to
the commentaries, reached over 70,000 words.
Also in 2010, as Frances continued his critique
through blog postings in Psychiatric Times, John Sadler
and I began a series of regular, DSM-5 conceptual issues
blogs in the same journal [18-37].
With the success of the Bulletin symposium, we
approached the Editor Emeritus of PEHM, Michael
Schwartz, and then the Editor, James Giordano, about
using the pages of PEHM to continue the DSM-5 discus-
sion under a different format, and with the goal of
reaching a broader audience. The new format would be
a series of “essential questions” for DSM-5, commentar-
ies by a series of individuals (some of them commenta-
tors from the Bulletin issues, others making a first
appearance in this article), and responses to the com-
mentaries by Frances. Such is the origin of this article.
(The general introduction, individual introductions andLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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sion, are written by this author (JP), the responses by
Allen Frances.
For this exercise we have distilled the wide-ranging
discussions from the Bulletin issues into six questions:
1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of
mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current
state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a
cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, trans-
formative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considera-
tions in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of
utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been
designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this
conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6)
the possibility and advisability, given all the problems
with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic
system. Part 1 [1] of this article covered the first two
questions, Part 2 [38] the second two questions, and
Part 3 [39] the final two questions. This text, Part 4,
contains the general conclusion.
We can fairly assume from the preceding discussions
that the DSM is at a crossroads. The promise of DSM-
III has not been realized, and where we go with DSM-5
and beyond is unclear. This has left us with a mix of
voices in the above commentaries that are at times har-
monious and at times cacophonous. On this note of
concordance and contention we could despair of ever
sorting out our nosology, or we might focus instead on
the agreements where we find them, take the disagree-
ments as occasions for further discussion, and try to
move forward.
Let me first review Allen Frances’ position and his
exchanges with his commentators, and then move to the
implications of this discussion for DSM-5 and the
future.
As all know, Frances did yeoman’s work with DSM-IV
and has been in open disagreement with much of the
DSM-5 process. As Chief of the DSM-IV Task Force, he
is in a unique, privileged, and controversial position to
be commenting on DSM-5.
Question 1
The first question, that of the conceptual status of psy-
chiatric disorder and their diagnoses, is the central ques-
tion in this article. For that reason, the discussion of this
question involves more commentary that the other five
questions, and also for that reason, the other five ques-
tions in one way or another follow from it. In addressing
this question of conceptual status and the five possible
responses to it, Frances begins, in the terminology of his
umpire metaphor, by informing us that “none of the five
umpires is completely right all of the time. And none is
totally wrong all of the time. Each has a season and ap-
propriate time at the plate.” He also notes that at thetime of DSM-III the biological Umpire 1 and the anti-
biological Umpires 3 and 5 were the main players in the
debate over the conceptual status of psychiatric disor-
ders, while, in contrast, the nominalist Umpire 2 and the
pragmatic Umpire 4 have assumed increased importance
in recent years.
In attempting to explain this shift Frances points to
psychiatry’s failures to fulfill the promises of DSM-III.
We have been unable to validate the DSM categories
with the Robins/Guze criteria, and there is a poor
match-up of DSM categories with findings in neurosci-
ence and genetics. For Frances this failure of biological
psychiatry to realize its expectations moves him toward
the second (nominalist) and fourth (pragmatic) umpire
positions. With the nominalist, second umpire position,
he assumes a middle ground between simple realism
and pure social construction, arguing that there are real
people suffering from real psychopathology, but that our
way of naming and defining the psychopathology may
not accurately represent the biological reality of those
conditions. Regarding the pragmatiist, fourth umpire
position, he insists on a pragmatic, practical dimension
in the construction and use of diagnostic categories. We
need to be cautious with the terminology in the sense
that calling himself nominalist and pragmatic does not
mean for Frances that there are no diseases out there
(the constructionist, third-umpire position). Although he
doesn’t use Peter Zachar’s language of practical kinds
[40] or Zachar and Kenneth Kendler’s language of anti-
essentialism [41], his position is consistent with theirs.
Finally, we need to add Frances’ caution that there is
something to be learned from all five positions.
In view of the complexity of the conceptual question,
it is not surprising that commentators offer a range of
responses, often not confining themselves to one of the
five umpire alternatives. Nassir Ghaemi locates himself
in the realist Umpire 1 position, while Michael Cerullo
places himself in a modified Umpire 1 position, and Jerome
Wakefield finds a home in an Umpire 1.5 “humble
realism.” With philosophical distinctions Claire Pouncey
joins Allen Frances in the nominalist Umpire 2 position.
Gary Greenberg is comfortable representing the con-
structivist Umpire 3 spot. Harold Pincus emphasizes the
pragmatic considerations of Umpire 4 and thus joins
Frances there. Thomas Szasz has long represented the
anti-psychiatry Umpire 5 position and continues to do so
here. Peter Zachar and Steven Lobello join Frances
in some combination of the Umpire 2 & 4 positions.
Joseph Pierre notes that various psychiatric disorders
require different positions, and Elliott Martin comments
on the interference of outside forces on the entire process.
For my part I have found the nominalist/pragmatic
compromise reasonable. It recognizes that there are psy-
chiatric diseases, that our current set of categories
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cumstance we need to pay close attention to the prac-
tical use of the categories.
Question 2
The second question is understandably related to the
first. If you can’t decide what a psychiatric disorder is,
you’re certainly going to have a hard time formulating a
definition of psychiatric disorder. Hannah Decker cap-
tures the flavor of this dilemma in her account of the
controversy over definition in the pre-DSM-III era. In
his struggles with both the anti-psychiatrists and the
psychologists Robert Spitzer lost his battle to define psy-
chiatric illness as a medical disorder. Both conceptual
and political issues defeated his effort. The struggle over
definition continues into the present, with our commen-
tators covering the range of no definition to precise
definition.
In this discussion Allen Frances can certainly claim
more experience than most through his personal efforts
to deal with the issue of definition in DSM-IV. His ex-
perience has left him both discouraged at the possibility
of getting it right and dispirited at the prospect of put-
ting too much effort into the project. As he muses:
“Humpty Dumpty: ‘When I choose a word it means just
what I choose it to mean’. When it comes to defining
the term ‘mental disorder’ or figuring out which condi-
tions qualify, we enter Humpty's world of shifting, am-
biguous, and idiosyncratic word usages. This is a
fundamental weakness of the whole field of mental
health.”
Nonetheless, Frances is not willing to abandon the no-
tion of including a definition in the diagnostic manual,
however flawed that might be. Among our commenta-
tors he is closest to Pierre’s compromise solution of a
flawed definition, and he would probably support the ef-
fort of Stein et al. [42], which might well become the
official definition in DSM-5. Our other commentators
assume positions at the extremes of the Frances/Pierre
compromise. At one extreme Warren Kinghorn sees no
need for a definition of mental illness, while at the other
extreme Jerome Wakefield offers his clearly formulated,
extensively published definition in terms of harmful dys-
function. Finally, John Chardavoyne suggests the notion
of a developing, changing definition.
For my part, I continue to feel that in the absence of a
consensus regarding the conceptual status of psychiatric
disorders and diagnoses, any definition will be imperfect;
and that leads me toward a loose, Wittgensteinian ap-
proach to definition, as indicated earlier.
Question 3
As was the case with the second question (that of defin-
ition), the third question – whether to assume aconservative or assertive posture in making changes in
the new manual – follows from Question 1, that of the
conceptual status of psychiatric entities. This issue, how-
ever, is different from that of definition. For the issue for
definition was: in the face of conceptual uncertainty,
should we attempt a definition or not? The issue with
the third question is: in the face of the same conceptual
uncertainly, should we be modest or aggressive in the
construction of the new manual?
Allen Frances has been very assertive in defending a
conservative approach to change in DSM-5. He argues
rather straightforwardly that, if current science does not
match well with the existing DSM categories, and alter-
ing the categories will not improve that match, why
change them? Why not leave them alone until science,
as in the NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC),
offers us guidance as to how to change them? And he
makes this argument in bold for proposed new diagno-
ses with minimal scientific foundation such as Attenu-
ated Psychosis Syndrome.
In arguing for a conservative approach Frances calls
on his experience in DSM-IV, where seemingly small
changes in diagnostic categories led to significant, unex-
pected consequences. He cites the DSM-IV experience
with the inclusion of Bipolar II and Asperger's, and a re-
write of the criteria for ADD. “Each decision was made
for excellent reasons that withstand the test of time –
but each led to an unexpected frenzy of diagnostic en-
thusiasm that far overshot the mark beyond the useful
purpose of the DSM IV intention.”
In addressing the commentaries on this question of
conversatism, we should recall that virtually all discus-
sants – in this article, in the Bulletin discussions, and in
the article by Regier and colleagues cited in the general
introduction – agree on a number of conclusions about
the DSMs: that the DSM-IV categorical profiles often do
not adequately reflect the heterogeneity of presentation
in individuals grouped under a particular category, that
the operationally defined categories, while achieving the
reliability that was their goal and in that way facilitating
research across different settings, also inhibit research
[43] by constricting it to the boundaries of the diag-
nostic criteria, that the diagnostic constructs create a
high rate of comorbidity, as well as a high rate of NOS
diagnoses, that most of the diagnoses fail the test of
the original Robins and Guze criteria [44], as well as
the additional Kendler [45] validator, that current find-
ings in genetics and neuroscience do not match up
with the DSM-IV categories, and finally that the re-
search findings of molecular genetics and neuroscience
regarding psychopathology are at this point quite
unsettled [46].
What is of great interest in Question 3 is that the same
set of facts and the same conceptual indecision lead
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this starting point Michael Cerullo concludes, like Fran-
ces, that the current uncertainty of psychiatric science
does not warrant substantial change in the new manual,
while Scott Waterman argues that that same uncertainty
necessitates such change. We gain some insight into this
difference by looking at some of the details. Waterman
recommends some changes – e.g., eliminating the axial
system and paring down the number of categories –that,
whatever their merits, do not address the flaws in DSM-
IV stemming from its inadequate scientific foundation.
When he addresses the latter, he says at one point, that
“[t]axonomy cannot lead conceptual innovation but can
only aspire to reflect it.” But he then says a little further
on: “Those diagnostic entities that remain should both
describe and help us investigate the phenotypes, etio-
pathogeneses, prognoses, and treatment responses of the
patients so categorized.” Here then is the controversy.
Given that the science is not in place to allow significant
redescription of psychiatric categories, should the cat-
egories be reformulated in a manner to facilitate further,
clarifying research? Frances has responded to this ques-
tion by saying that “[w]e don't really know which
changes would improve science” and “[c]hanges may re-
tard science by making previous findings incompatible
with new ones.”
In another section of the article Joseph Pierre entered
this discussion by stating (and reflecting the first part of
Waterman’s argument): “Diagnostic revision should fol-
low, not precede, etiologic discoveries – in other words,
a new DSM-5 needs etiologic discoveries, but etiologic
discoveries do not need a new DSM.” In this matter of
new etiologic discoveries we should recognize a conflict
over diagnostic criteria only partially touched on by the
discussants. On the one hand the criteria are needed for
reliability among researchers; on the other hand it is
now commonly recognized that the same criteria impede
research by confining researchers to study groups
defined by the criteria. The only proposal we have had
for overcoming this conflict has been that of the NIMH
RDoC group – a proposal to ignore the DSM categories
and criteria entirely in developing their foci of
investigation.
Frances is less clear about his conservative position
when it involves diagnoses such as the paraphilias that
are more value-laden, that are mostly the judgments of
public morality, and whose status as psychiatric disor-
ders will not be decided by future science. In defense
and explanation of DSM-IV, he offers the historical con-
text in which he and his Task Force felt it was important
to maintain the high-threshold standard for change in
the case of all diagnoses. He acknowledges that this may
have resulted in leaving diagnoses in place that would
better have been “sunsetted.”In his commentary Andrew Hinderliter takes up the
other side of this question on the value-based diagnoses,
and makes a cogent argument for questioning and re-
moving some of the paraphilias.
For my part I am in agreement with Frances, as well
as Cerullo and Pierre, that the current state of psychi-
atric science warrants a conservative approach to change
in DSM-5, and that the limitations in our knowledge
cannot support the aggressive approach advocated by
Waterman. These arguments become weaker, however,
when it comes to the paraphilias, where values predom-
inate and decisions won’t be decided by scienfitic
research.
Question 4
The fourth question, that of pragmatic considerations in
developing a psychiatric nosology, once again connects
to the questions that precede it, and ultimately to Ques-
tion 1 – the conceptual status of our nosology. We have
already dealt with the shaky conceptual foundations of
the diagnostic categories, as well as some of the conse-
quences that follow from that – the problems in devel-
oping an adequate definition of psychiatric illness, and
the necessary cautions in making unscientifically based
changes in the new manual. With the current question
we add another consideration into our discussion:
whether, in the face of the weak science that undergirds
the diagnostic manual, we should pay particular atten-
tion to the practical effects of any envisioned changes.
Everyone participating in this discussion has responded
unambivalently: Of course, how could we not consider
the practical effects of our diagnostic constructions?
Allen Frances frames this response in the terminology of
the Hippocratic maxim: Primum non nocere – First, do
no harm. Or in more contemporary language: what-
ever changes you make in the construction of a new
diagnostic manual, don't lose track of the fact that
your goal is the treatment of psychiatric patients; con-
sider whether your modifications will cause more benefit
than harm.
A question now arises in this discussion: is there a
conflict between science and pragmatism? Shouldn’t the
major decisions be based on science rather than prag-
matic considerations. One could argue, for instance, that
the goal of a diagnostic manual is to identify and de-
scribe the diseases in the best possible manner, without
regard for how the manual might be used by various
user groups, or what effect it might have on patients.
That is certainly not the stated goal of the DSM-IV and
its predecessors, and it would probably be difficult to
find someone to argue this position.
Frances and the commentators all agree that prag-
matic issues play a role in developing a nosology. Fran-
ces points out that the DSM has an enormous effect on
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gets diagnosed, how they are treated, who pays for it,
whether someone can be involuntarily committed, etc.),
as well as in public policy (allotment of resources, hand-
ling of sex offenders in the legal system, etc.). The four
commentators add further thoughts to the science/prag-
matics discussion. Warren Kinghorn points out that
after you decide to allow for pragmatic considerations,
you then have to decide whom you’re going to empower
to make the pragmatic decisions (he could have added
that we have the same problem in deciding whom we
will empower to evaluate the science). Douglas Porter
notes that the science/pragmatics distinction is some-
what artificial in that the science itself is so value/
laden. Joel Paris adds further that the science is so
inadequate that we have no choice but to make
decisions on other than a scientific basis. Finally,
Joseph Pierre reminds us that in the consulting room
we are focused on the suffering person in front of us,
and pay little attention to “scientific” factors such as
the number of criteria the person meets for a particu-
lar diagnosis.
Let me now summarize some of the circumstances in
which the dialectic of science and pragmatics is opera-
tive in developing a psychiatric nosology.
First, as indicated above, Allen Frances describes in a
general way the effects of the nosology on all aspects of
both clinical mental health care and public policy
regarding mental health issues.
Second, if the scientific basis of a putative category is
weak enough to question whether it should be in the
manual or not, bear in mind that putting it in the man-
ual will mean more treatment for that group of now offi-
cially labeled individuals. For instance, the storm over
Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome was in large measure
provoked by the fact that outcome studies for this puta-
tive diagnosis were showing a 66% rate of false positives
for progression to schizophrenia or other serious
psychosis.
Third, to the extent that the scientific basis of a diag-
nostic category is weak, issues of practical concern will
play a greater role in the construction of the category.
For instance, if the category is shaky, should you
emphasize specificity over sensitivity – better to have
false negatives than false positives?
Fourth, treatment side effects should probably play a
role in sensitivity/specificity balance. For example, if the
appropriate treatment is a neuroleptic, with potentially
significant side effects, should we again err on the side
of specificity over sensitivity – fewer false positives in
the face of unnecessary use of neuroleptics.
Fifth, as noted above, diagnoses that are highly value-
laden, e.g. the paraphilias, don’t readily lend themselves
to a scientific determination as to their disease status.Decisions about their inclusion in a nosology will inevit-
ably involve considerations other than scientific ones.
Sixth, and finally, all diagnostic categories, however
solid their scientific foundation, will involve the issue of
sensitivity and specificity in their diagnostic criteria. The
example I used earlier was that of major depression. In-
crease the number of required criteria and you increase
specificity and produce false negatives. Decrease the
number of required criteria and you increase sensitivity
and produce false positives. The use of dimensional
measures appears to ameliorate this problem by allowing
for every degree of the condition, but in fact it merely
moves the pragmatics of sensitivity/specificity to another
question: at what point on the scale do we say, no major
depression.
With this question, then, Frances, the commentators,
and this author are all in agreement regarding the ap-
propriate inclusion of pragmatic issues in the construc-
tion of psychiatric diagnoses. The commentators, rather
than presenting disagreements, focus more on the fine
points of the discussion – e.g. Kinghorn pointing to the
question as to who is empowered to make the pragmatic
decisions, Porter adding the same question as to who is
empowered to evaluate the value-laden science, Paris
emphasizing the limitations of our science, and Pierre
emphasizing that the fact of dealing with the person in
one’s consulting room nudges the discussion toward a
pragmatic focus on that individual as opposed to a focus
on trying to get the DMS-IV diagnosis right.
Question 5
Discussion of the fifth question, utility, has had two foci:
the general structure of DSM-IV, and the primary, pro-
posed innovation of DSM-5, dimensional measures. The
first focus is heralded by the statement from the Intro-
duction to DSM-IV:
“The utility and credibility of DSM-IV require that it
focus on its clinical, research, and educational purposes
and be supported by an extensive empirical foundation.
Our highest priority has been to provide a helpful
guide to clinical practice. We hoped to make DSM-IV
practical and useful for clinicians by striving for brevity
of criteria sets, clarity of language, and explicit
statements of the constructs embodied in the
diagnostic criteria. An additional goal was to facilitate
research and improve communication among clinicians
and researchers. [47], p. xv].”
Regarding this focus on utility in DSM-IV, I pointed
out in the earlier introduction to Question 5 that the
question, “Is there a conflict over utility in the DSMs?,”
contains in fact three questions: is there a conflict
among the manual’s various goals?; what goal or purpose
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off with more than one manual? Given that Allen Frances
was the primary architect of DSM-IV and thus
responsible for the above-quoted statement from
its Introduction, it is not surprising that, while acknow-
ledging possible tensions among the different goals
of the manual, he comes to the defense of a single
manual. He writes:
“Psychiatric classifications are like maps – and like
maps there is no single best way of charting the
territory. Depending on our purpose, we may prefer to
use a geological map, or a political map, or a
topographical map, or an economic map, or a climate
map-or some combination. Similarly, it might have
made sense to have different and complementary
DSMs – one for clinicians, another for researchers, and
others for education, for forensics, for billing, for
gathering statistics, and so on. The DSM we have is a
common denominator, with both the strengths and the
weaknesses that derive from attempting to serve so
many different masters. . .”
“DSM-IV does none of its jobs perfectly and its
awkward fit certainly creates a variety of problems.
Some clinicians refuse to learn DSM and stick to their
own personal prototypes of disorders. Many
epidemiological researchers ignore the requirement for
clinical significance before making a psychiatric
diagnosis and therefore report ridiculously high rates of
mental illness in the general population. Some students
take the DSM descriptions too literally and lose the
patient as they evaluate the criteria. Lawyers often find
loopholes because the language of DSM is frustratingly
below legal requirements for precision. And so on.”
“But the unifying and synthesizing whole of DSM-IV is
still worth much more than would be the accumulated
sum of its individual parts. However imperfect, the
DSM's special value is as a common denominator that
avoids a Babel and is good enough (if admittedly not
best) at each of its jobs.”
In these comments Frances deals with the three-part
question posed above by granting a potential conflict
among DSM-IV’s stated goals (part 1), making a strong
argument for maintaining a single manual (part 3), and
scanting the question as to what goal is best served by
the manual. Assuming that he would still endorse the
statement from the Introduction to DSM-IV, we could
assume he would still place clinical practice as the pri-
mary goal of the manual.
Unlike the discussion in the other questions, where
some or most of the commentators were in agreement
with Frances’ argument, in the question of utility we
have all three commentators lined up against him: allrecognizing the clinical/research conflict, all agreeing
that DSM-IV is prejudiced toward research, and two of
the three leaning toward separating clinical and research
diagnostic documents. While in agreement that there is
a conflict between the clinical and research goals of the
DSM, the three commentators offer different perspec-
tives on the conflict.
Owen Whooley adopts Aristotle’s distinction between
theoretical and practical knowledge (episteme and phron-
esis) and argues for a deep, metaphysical divide between
the research and clinical goals of DSM-III/IV – in Aris-
totelian terms a divide between the search for universal
laws versus individualized care of the particular patient.
Joseph Pierre focuses on the DSM architects’ own con-
fusion regarding the goal and use of the manual. Al-
though the diagnostic criteria are claimed to have a
primary clinic use, their real goal is in promoting re-
search. But in fact, as pointed out above, they impede re-
search as much as they facilitate it. Pierre points out
that the most promising research, that of the RDoC, is
being done outside the confines of the DSM.
Finally, Aaron Mishara and Michael Schwartz point to
the clinical/research conflict as a consequence of basing
DSM-III on a Hempelian scientific model; they argue
that a DSM designed with the ideal-type structure they
advocate would eliminate the clinician/researcher split
and would in fact serve the two groups equally well.
The second focus of the utility question is the intro-
duction of dimensional measures into DSM-5. Regier
and colleagues announced this innovation in the follow-
ing manner:
“The single most important precondition for moving
forward to improve the clinical and scientific utility of
DSM-5 will be the incorporation of simple dimensional
measures for assessing syndromes within broad
diagnostic categories and supraordinate dimensions
that cross current diagnostic boundaries. Thus, we have
decided that one, if not the major, difference between
DSM-IV and DSM-5 will be the more prominent use of
dimensional measures in DSM-5 [48] (see also [49]).”
These authors assure us once again that these dimen-
sions will provide clinical as well as scientific utility. The
proposed dimensional measures raise two questions:
should they even be in the manual, and who will use
them. The questions raised above about who will use
them are apposite here. Given their undemonstrated sci-
entific status, Frances challenged their introduction into
DSM-5 in Bulletin 2, Whooley challenges it in this sec-
tion (drawing agreement from Frances), and Paris chal-
lenges it in the context of Question 6. First and
colleagues have argued that any change in the existing
manual should use clinical utility as a criterion of change
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clinical utility of the proposed measures [51].
To include my opinion in this discussion, I can cer-
tainly sympathize with Frances’ argument for a single
manual, but I also agree with the arguments of the com-
mentators regarding the conflict between clinical and re-
search utility (and have written about the conflict [25]).
Whooley and Pierre might well argue for separate man-
uals, although they don’t quite take their arguments to
that conclusion. I would opt for a variation on the sim-
plification proposed by Mishara and Schwartz: to wit,
the current manual with its prototypal/ideal-type cat-
egories, and the diagnostic criteria moved to the back of
the manual. In that manner the manual would be clearly
designed for clinicians, and the appendix with diagnostic
criteria would be available for researchers. Thus one
manual, but a manual that was genuinely useful for clini-
cians and that placed specific research needs in an
appendix.
We might make the same point with respect to the
dimensional measures. They have no defenders in this
discussion, and thus no dispute between Frances and
his commentators. They could be confined to the same
fate as the diagnostic criteria – one more appendix at
the back of the manual. They would be there for
whomever might want to use them, but they wouldn’t
be in the face of clinicians who would just ignore them
anyway.
Question 6
The second question asked whether the multiple pro-
blems of DSM-IV warrant a conservative or aggressive
attitude toward change in DSM-5. The sixth and final
question takes this issue to its ultimate interrogation:
should we consider a major overhaul or even another
manual? Consistent with his response to Question 2,
Frances argues that the state of psychiatric science dic-
tates minimal change, not the “paradigm shift” proposed
by the DSM-5 architects, and not any other form of
major overhaul. Around the question of alternate sys-
tems he writes:
“Every month or so, someone (usually very smart and
passionate) sends me a detailed proposal for a new
diagnostic system offered as an alternative to the
jumbled, pedestrian, atheoretical, and purely descriptive
method used in DSM. The new system is invariably
theory driven, clever, neat, and plausible. Surely, it is
quite easy to be more coherent than a DSM that
consists of a jumble of disorders gathered
together largely through a historical accreting
process based mostly on clinical observation and
descriptive research – without an underlying
theory or deep knowledge of causality.”Frances argues that none of the alternate systems on
offer is anywhere near ready for actual use. He also
invokes the NIMH Research Domain Criteria project
that promises to change the scientific landscape of
psychiatry in the future. Pending findings from that en-
deavor, which may indeed warrant a significant refa-
shioning of the DSM, we should hold tight and await the
return of the RDoC jury.
We can sort the possible responses to this question
into three groups: alternative systems already in develop-
ment, alternative nosological systems developed by the
commentators themselves, and major restructuring pro-
posals for the DSM. For a representative of the first
group we have First’s presentation of the NIMH Re-
search Domain Criteria Project (RDoC). In the second
group belongs Pies’ proposal (along with those of Hayes,
Mender, Mishara and Schwartz, Peled, and Pies in Bul-
letin 2). And to represent the third group we have Paris’
discussion of the thrust toward dimensional measures in
DSM-5 (also covered by Whooley in the preceding
question).
The first commentary follows on Frances’ proposal to
await results from the NIMH RDoC project. Michael
First provides a clear description of the project, empha-
sizing that this is research project, not an alternative
diagnostic manual. But it is a research project whose
findings may significantly affect all DSMs that follow in
its wake. In a second commentary Ronald Pies reviews
his effort at imagining an alternative diagnostic system,
described more thoroughly in Bulletin 2. His proposal
involves two innovations: basing the system on proto-
typal diagnostic constructs, and dramatically reducing
the number of diagnoses from several hundred to a large
handful. Although structured differently, his proposal is
quite consonant with that of Mishara and Schwartz in
the emphasis on prototypes and a limited number of cat-
egories. Finally, Joel Paris tackles the major innovation
of DSM-5, the introduction of a variety of dimensional
measures. His critique overlaps with some of the discus-
sion in the previous question on utility - for the obvious
reason that the introduction of such measures involves
both questions, utility and alternate systems. He is in
agreement with previous discussion of this topic – indeed,
we have not had a positive response, either from Frances
or any of the commentators, toward the proposed dimen-
sional measures. Paris also includes a suggestion, again
harkening back to the discussion of Question 5, that the
manual might work better by being split into two: a
shorter version for clinicians and a more detailed version
for researchers.
With question 6 I can in some fashion agree with
everyone. Allen Frances makes a convincing case that,
pending more definitive science than currently available,
we should stick with the DSM that we have, but, in
Phillips et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:14 Page 8 of 14
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/14agreement with Joel Paris, without the dimensional mea-
sures currently planned. Frances, like other commenta-
tors, also makes a case for awaiting findings of the
NIMH Research Domain Criteria project as described by
Michael First. Of course none of us knows whether the
RDoC project will produce the ‘paradigm shift’ it pro-
mises for psychiatric nosology. Contra Frances, I also
agree with the arguments that the current manual is
tilted toward research, and that it is too cluttered with
diagnostic categories. I agree with the proposals of Mis-
hara and Schwartz, and of Pies, to reduce the number
and focus on prototypes. My own addition would be to
move the diagnostic criteria (along with the dimen-
sions) to the back of the manual. Frances defends the
retention of operational definitions and diagnostic cri-
teria. The argument for retention remains the original
argument for reliability. The argument for dismissal
(perhaps to an appendix) is that clinicians don’t use
them, they impede as well as enhance research, and
they produce reliability without validity, with the inevit-
able consequence of excessive comorbidity and NOS
diagnoses.
Further considerations: DSM-5 and the future
I indicated at the beginning of this general conclusion
that the central question in this article is the first one,
the nature of mental disorders, and that the remaining
questions are to one degree or another secondary to the
first. In these concluding remarks I return to the first
question and try to draw out the analysis a bit further. I
do this in terms of natural kind analysis and complexity
theory.
Natural kind analysis
First, recall that questions regarding the conceptual sta-
tus, or nature, of psychiatric disorders stem from failure
of DSM-III/IV categories to achieve scientific validity as
genuine, scientifically based disease entities. When the
categories of DSM-III were defined with diagnostic cri-
teria in 1980, it was assumed that reliability would be
first accomplished and that, with further science based
on the operationally defined categories, validity would
follow. Robins and Guze, representing the Washington
U group, had set five criteria or standards of validity
(called “phases” of validity in the seminal article) [44],
and it was assumed that those standards would be met
in the ensuing years. The great shock of the past forty
years is that the DSM-III/IV categories have not met the
Robins/Guze standards. As Regier and colleagues wrote
in 2009, already quoted above,
“The expectation of Robins and Guze was that
each clinical syndrome described in the Feighner
criteria, RDC, and DSM-III would ultimately bevalidated by its separation from other disorders,
common clinical course, genetic aggregation in families,
and further differentiation by future laboratory tests—
which would now include anatomical and functional
imaging, molecular genetics, pathophysiological
variations, and neuropsychological testing. To the
original validators Kendler added differential response
to treatment, which could include both
pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions.
[48] 645.”
It is worthwhile to do a brief review of the criteria
along with the current status of clinical experience and
psychiatric research.
1. Clinical description
This includes symptoms aggregating into syndromes,
along with other information involved in the
common description. Clinical work with the DSM
categories has shown a great heterogeneity of
presentation, thus defeating the criterion that a valid
category should present a uniformly described
syndrome.
This phenomenon of heterogeneous presentation
should not be a surprise, as it is common in the rest
of medicine, where the same disease may present in
different ways, and a similar presentation may
represent different diseases. For instance, syphilis and
streptococcus may each present in a variety of ways
(same disease, different presentations), and shortness
of breath may represent CHF, pneumonia, or COPD
(same presentation, different diseases). The reason
this is not a problem for general medicine is that the
labeling of something as a disease is not dependent
on the clinical presentation, as in psychiatry. We can
conclude that, with respect to this standard of
validity, psychiatry is in the place of the rest of
medicine over 100 years ago. Further, we can note
that “clinical description” was a poor choice by
Robins and Guze and that, based on the rest of
medicine, it was bound to fail.
2. Laboratory studies
The most striking example of the failure of
laboratory studies is that we still do not have a clear
biological marker for any of our DSM categories [52].
And we have to add that current work in
neuroscience, neuroimaging, and genetics has not led
to clear patters that match up with the DSM
categories [46]. Probably the most alarming
findings are in genetic studies, where the mismatch
between genetic patterns and DSM categories
has become quite clear [53,54]. What now seems
almost obvious is that the science is not falling
into place because the DSM categories do not
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genetics, do not represent real phenotypes.
3. Delimitation from other disorders
With this criterion Robins and Guze recognized that
the first two criteria might allow for two disorders to
overlap with similar description and laboratory
findings, and that we would need a way to
distinguish them. In strong contrast to meeting this
standard, DSM-IV has been plagued with high
comorbidity, along with fuzzy boundaries between
categories and the use of NOS diagnoses.
4. Follow-up study
The authors acknowledge that this is not a strong
criterion, inasmuch as the same condition could have
variable outcomes. That has of course been found to
be the case with major disorders such as
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
5. Family study
The authors argued for this as a strong criterion, and
indeed, identical twin studies have shown family
aggregation for many conditions. The problem is that
family studies have shown both a higher familial
incidence of the condition of the target patient, but
also a high incidence of other psychiatric disorders
[55]. And genetic studies have shown similar genetic
patterns in a variety of conditions [46,53,56]. Thus,
research has in some ways (identical twin studies)
supported the DSM categories but in other ways
(family and genetic dispersal) has not.
6. *Differential response to treatment
In 1990 Kenneth Kendler proposed a sixth criterion
for validity [45]. Unfortunately, clinical experience
over the past twenty years has moved rather
dramatically against this criterion. Rather than
classes of psychopharmacologic agents matching up
with particular diagnoses, we have moved into an era
of pharmacologic promiscuity in which many agents
are being found to be effective for a variety of
disorders (e.g., neuroleptics effective as mood
stabilizers, SSRIs effective for a great variety of
conditions).
If the DSM diagnostic categories have failed to meet
the Robins/Guze standards of validity, we are forced to
ask, what are these diagnostic categories? Are they any-
thing real? This of course was the question posed as
Question 1. Allen Frances responded, with agreement
from a significant number of the commentators, that the
categories are constructs that do not reflect real disease
entities. He quickly added that that is not an anti-realist,
anti-psychiatry, purely social constructionist position.
Mental illness exists in the real world, and there are a
lot of people suffering from it. It’s just that our current
diagnostic categories may not be accurate presentationsof the mental illness out there. Our diagnostic constructs
are simply our best, current effort to describe psychiatric
illnesses. These constructs have been shown to be quite
inaccurate, and we can expect that with time and more
science the diagnoses will more accurately reflect and
describe the range of psychiatric illness.
One way to get a further perspective on this question
of the DSM categories and the nature of psychiatric ill-
ness is through what is called natural kind analysis. The
latter refers to the effort to classify the things of the
world in a realistic manner that does not depend on
human judgment. A cow is a natural kind, a unicorn is
not. You may come across a specimen in the real world
and declare it to belong to the natural kind, cow. You
won’t find anything fitting the natural kind, unicorn.
Writing about natural kinds, Ian Hacking remarks: “The
canonical examples have been: water, sulphur, horse,
tiger, lemon, multiple sclerosis, heat and the color yel-
low. What an indifferent bunch!” [57], p. 167]. Hacking
includes everything that can be classified, but in a more
strict sense a natural kind is considered to have an es-
sential structure that can be described by necessary and
sufficient conditions. For instance, if something has an
atomic weight of 79, that something is gold; if another
thing has a molecular structure of H20, that thing is
water. In both cases the thing in the world meets neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for being gold or water.
John Locke provided an early description of real natural
kinds with his distinction between real and nominal
essences. The latter category represents our casual man-
ner of classifying things, as in the Hacking quote above.
A real essence would be defined in terms of its micro-
structure. In making this distinction Locke anticipated
our modern tendency to define strict natural kind status
in terms of the reductionist language of physics. The
examples of gold and water are characteristic of this
tendency.
In natural kind analysis there is a fundamental divide
between strict natural-kind theorists as just described
who assign natural-kind status only to entities that can
be defined by essential properties and necessary and
sufficient conditions, and other theorists who argue that
there is a scale of natural kindedness, that something
may be a natural kind in a strong or weak sense. In
The Disorder of Things [58] John Dupré makes a strong
case for the second position. “This thesis is an assertion
of the extreme diversity of the contents of the world.
There are countless kinds of things, I maintain, subject
each to its own characteristic behavior and interactions”
(p. 1).
In a strict sense all medical and psychiatric conditions
would be judged as not natural kinds because in every
case designating something as a disease involves a
human value judgment. A broken bone may be an
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bone an ailment involves a value judgment that does not
inhere in the bone.
It is much more useful to sort out the world – and the
world of illness – with degrees of natural kindedness.
For instance, HIV infection can be defined with the ne-
cessary and sufficient condition of a positive test; Hun-
tington’s disease can be defined with the necessary and
sufficient condition of the Huntington gene HTT. These
are relatively strong natural kinds. On the other hand,
migraine is defined by clinical evaluation; schizophrenia
and major depression are defined by symptoms and
diagnostic criteria. These latter three are all quite weak
natural kinds compared to HIV or Huntington’s disease,
and even more so compared to gold or water. There are
no necessary and sufficient conditions for calling some-
thing migraine, schizophrenia, or major depression. In-
deed, if schizophrenia, for instance, turns out be not one
disease but rather a cluster of diseases, it may be a nat-
ural kind only in a very weak sense.
In dealing with psychiatric disorders, and with the
DSM categories, Peter Zachar makes a useful distinction
between classical categories and prototype categories
[59]. The former refer to essentialist, strict-sense natural
kinds. Either something meets the conditions of belonging
to the category, or it doesn’t. Prototype categories describe
an idealized exemplar of the category and then judge indi-
viduals as more or less like the prototype. Individuals
don’t meet necessary and sufficient conditions; rather, they
are more or less like the ideal exemplar. (Of course we
could also say that they meet the necessary and sufficient
conditions more or less.) Zachar describes the DSM cat-
egories as prototype categories and not natural kinds,
since they are based on prototype descriptions of the re-
spective disorders. Technically he is only half right, since
in fact the DSM categories are hybrids. They are proto-
types in that they all have both prototype descriptions and
lists of diagnostic criteria that the individual may meet in
varying degrees. But the fact that the criteria all have a
minimally sufficient number of criteria for making the
diagnosis flips them into a status of classical categories,
with necessary and sufficient conditions. Meet the min-
imal required number of criteria and you have the dis-
order; don’t meet it and you don’t have the condition.
If we accept a view of natural kinds as existing on a
scale of strength and weakness, it follows that phenom-
ena at the weak end of the scale, where membership is
not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, may
be grouped in different ways to satisfy different strat-
egies. If this sounds arbitrary, that’s because it is. At this
point in time all psychiatric disorders are weak natural
kinds, albeit some weaker than others. As weak natural
kinds, we will group them as it seems useful for what-
ever purpose we have in mind. Our groupings will startwith the commonalities – the natural kind status – that
we do find, and our decisions as to how to proceed from
there will depend on what we find most useful for what
we are trying to accomplish. It is obvious that some
groupings will be useful than others.
We can readily connect this analysis with the discus-
sion in Question 1. Those arguing for a strict realism
(Umpire 1) – diagnostic categories accurately describing
real psychiatric disorders – can be called the natural
kind essentialists in this discussion. Those arguing with
Allen Frances that the categories are constructs that
point, however poorly, to real psychiatric illness (Umpire
2), are the weak natural kind theorists. Those arguing
that the categories are pure social constructions, or that
there is no mental illness (Umpires 3 & 5), assume a
position that the diagnostic categories have no natural
kind status of any kind. Finally, those who argue that the
categories serve pragmatic goals (Umpire 3) are again
weak natural kind theorists who link up with the second
umpire. (Allen Frances, we may recall, declared himself
a combination of Umpires 2 & 4 - in that way defining
himself as a weak natural-kind theorist on two counts.)
For an example of psychiatric disorders as weak nat-
ural kinds, let’s imagine that the current category,
schizophrenia, proves, as seems likely, to include a var-
iety of conditions with different genetic patterns, differ-
ent endophenotypes, different outcomes, and so forth.
For a variety of reasons we may decide to retain the
supercategory, schizophrenia, or to break it up into five,
ten, or fifty separate conditions. There will probably be
no one, right answer to the question, how to group or
regroup all the individuals that now fall under that cat-
egory. Which of course is to say that we don’t expect
any of the possible outcomes to enjoy the status of
strong natural kind with necessary and sufficient condi-
tions like those of Huntington’s disease. A classification
based on endophenotypes, such as the RDoC enterprise
(to be discussed below), might claim stronger scientific,
natural kind status, and for that reason might make a
claim for priority in the reclassification of schizophrenia.
But that classification might be very unwieldy as well as
less desirable for other reasons. At this point we have no
idea how we will want to classify today’s schizophrenics
in ten years.
Or let’s imagine we decide to remove the paraphilias
from the diagnostic manual for a variety of pragmatic
and political/societal reasons. They will still remain weak
natural-kind conditions or personality types, but for rea-
sons other than scientific ones will no longer be mem-
bers of the diagnostic manual. In that case it’s hard to
imagine any scientific finding that will move the para-
philias into a strong natural kind status requiring us to
declare them psychiatric diseases that must remain in
the manual.
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to address the NIMH RDoC project. Michael First has
provided an excellent description of the project in his
commentary on Question 6. The most striking thing
about the project is that the research is being conducted
outside the confines of the DSM categories. The develo-
pers of the project recognize that the effort to validate
the DSM categories as real phenotypes has failed. Their
work is based on the assumptions that 1) psychiatric dis-
orders originate in disruptions or malfunctions of neural
circuitry, and 2) that specific circuitry malfunctions can
be linked to specific cognitive and behavioral abnormal-
ities. Their presumption is further that the genetic basis
of these malfunctions may be more clearly defined than
the complex patterns associated with DSM categories.
The target dysfunctions of the RDoC research would
then represent genuine endophenotypes. Of course it
remains to be seen how successful the RDoC project will
be, and whether it will translate into a more scientific
nosology than the current DSM. The authors of DSM-5
hold out the promise that the RDoC research will be
integrated into DSM-5 and will effectively save it [60].
Complexity theory
The above analysis examined the nature of psychiatric
disorders and diagnoses in terms of natural kind ana-
lysis. The conclusion of that examination was that psy-
chiatric disorders are weak natural kinds. We now
approach psychiatric conditions from a different per-
spective, complexity theory. Complexity theory, and the
related chaos theory, have been described in a variety of
way. For this discussion I will follow the relatively simple
and straightforward approach to complexity developed
by Bechtel and Richardson [61].
The approach described by Bechtel and Richardson to
analyze complex behavior is one of decomposition and
localization, or decomposition and reassembly. The sys-
tem is decomposed into its parts and then understood
as a whole determined by the organization of the com-
ponent parts. They describe three levels of such mech-
anistic explanation. The first, termed aggregative,
describes a system in which each part has its task, and
functioning of the whole can be understood in terms of
the components working together, each contributing its
specific function. The working of ordinary machines like
clocks and automobiles can be understood in this bot-
tom-up, aggregative analysis.
Biological systems virtually never permit of such re-
ductive analysis. Bechtel and Richardson describe further
levels of complexity to accommodate biologic systems.
“Some machines, however, are much more complex: one
component may affect and be affected by several
others, with a cascading effect; or there may be sig-
nificant feedback from “later” to “earlier” stages. In thelatter case, what is functionally dependent becomes un-
clear. Interaction among components becomes critical.
Mechanisms of this latter kind are complex systems. . .In
such cases, attempting to understand the operation of
the entire machine by following the activities in each
component in a brute force manner is liable to be futile”
(p. 18).
Analysis of complex systems proceeds through an
interplay of analysis and synthesis, bottom-up and top-
down approaches. The whole is understood in terms of
the parts, but the parts are also understood in terms of
the whole. In the simpler form of complex system
termed component system, the component parts can still
be studied independently, despite the fact that their ac-
tual functioning will depend on the total organization of
the system. In the more complex integrated system the
component parts lose their independence and can only
be studied as components of the integrated system.
What they are and how they work will change with the
changing organization of the whole system.
Virtually all biologic systems are complex, as are virtu-
ally all diseases. Although a disease like Huntington’s
disease might be described as a component system, with
straightforward Mendelian causality, most psychiatric
disorders, to the extent that it is appropriate to describe
them as unitary disorders (as opposed to classifications
that comprise many separate disorders), are integrated
systems. “In integrated systems, systemic organization is
significantly involved in determining constituent func-
tions” (p. 20).
The problem in recognizing psychiatric disorders as
complex, integrated systems is that it is extremely diffi-
cult to study them in this manner. Any factor playing a
role in the production of the disorder is affected by all
the other factors at play. At the extreme we will say that
no two individuals will have exactly the same disorder.
To illustrate this problematic, I invoke the work of
Kenneth Kendler, psychiatry’s premier researcher on the
causation of psychiatric illnesses. Kendler has presented
a mixed picture in the matter of complexity, arguing
strongly for a complexity, decomposition-reassembly,
approach to psychiatric etiology [62], and conducting his
research in a manner that combines aggregative and
integrated styles of analysis. In two articles on develop-
mental models for major depression in women and men,
he developed the models through the analysis of mul-
tiple risk factors, seen both as direct causal agents and
as interacting, mutually influencing causal factors
[63,64]. In his recent “The Dappled Nature of Causes of
Psychiatric Illness: Replacing the Organic-functional/
hardward-software Dichotomy with Empirically Based
Pluralism,” [65] he acknowledges his aggregative ap-
proach (“Furthermore, for pragmatic reasons, I initially
assume an independence of difference-makers that does
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spective variance of multiple causal factors for schizo-
phrenia, major depression, and alcohol dependence in a
rather thoroughly additive manner. He ends the article
with a further acknowledgment that the methodology of
the research does not do justice to the complexity of
psychiatric disorders.
“The results of the empirically based pluralistic analysis
of the causes of SZ, MD and AD reinforce the
conclusions from a prior essay that the commonly
expressed wish to develop an etiologically based
nosology for psychiatric disorders is deeply
problematic. Psychiatric disorders are a result of
multiple etiological processes impacting on many
different levels and often further intertwined by
mediational and moderational interactions between
levels. It is not possible a priori to identify one
privileged level that can unambiguously be used as the
basis for developing a nosologic system.”
“My call for an empirically based pluralism does not
reflect pessimism about the future of research in the
etiology of psychiatric disorders. Surely, they are
stunningly complex. But having overly simplified views
of them, often ideologically driven, has only hampered
our field. Following methods of decomposition and
reassembly, progress has been made in the scientific
understanding of very complex systems. Having a
realistic view of the causal landscapes of psychiatric
disorders can only help (p. 385)”.
We can take two lessons from Kendler’s experience.
The first is that research into psychiatric disorders as
complex systems will be very difficult. The second is that
the research will involve decisions as to which factors,
levels of analysis, etc. to prioritize. The prioritizing of
one over the other will result in a different picture of the
respective disorder. And of course now we are back with
the issues of natural kind analysis – different manners of
sorting the field of psychopathology, each potentially
equally legitimate, and choices made to serve particular
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